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INTRODUCTION 1.
Since the entry of the Kenyan 
defence forces (KDF) into Somalia, 
it was expected that Kenya would 
suffer blows of reprisal attacks from 
her neighbour. Even before it started, 
the military expedition was met by a 
series of threats from the Al-Shabaab 
that it would attack Kenya if it dared 
send its forces to Somalia [1].
Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) 
preemptive and preventive actions 
were justiﬁ   ed after the terrorist 
group Al-Shabaab performed a series 
of kidnappings and cross-border 
incursions into Kenya, all of which 
threatened security and the lucrative 
tourism industry in East Africa’s 
largest economy [2].
Towards the end of 2011 events 
like the kidnapping of two foreigners 
and the killing of another in the Kenyan 
resorts on the east coast, the abduction 
of two aid workers from the Dadaab 
refugee camp, and the attack against 
Kenyan soldiers in cross-border raids 
raised a lot of concern for the Kenyan 
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intelligence that the Al-Shabaab 
terrorist group would continue to 
attack Kenya. Therefore, the most 
appropriate decision on behalf of 
Kenya was to conduct a military 
operation to take preventive action to 
stop such further attack [4]. Because 
the terrorist group had previously 
attacked Kenya, preventive action 
was justiﬁ   ed. Given the sporadic 
nature of terrorist attacks, it appeared 
that the threat was escalating. 
Therefore, a decisive opportunity 
to attack and damage such a group 
prior to it launching another attack 
on Kenya was seized [5].
The Kenya Defence Forces decided 
to use a campaign strategy because, 
given the nature of the terrorist group, 
it was difﬁ  cult, if not impossible, to 
defeat a terrorist group in a single strike. 
But in most cases, terrorist groups do 
not facilitate the targeting structure 
to carry out this approach since, for 
example, most terrorist groups are 
dispersed across a number of cells with 
little contact between them [6].
As a result, there may not be 
enough information to stage a 
campaign. Consequently, in most 
situations, governments are reduced 
to attacking terrorist organizations 
on a piecemeal basis, using a series 
of individual strikes [7]. 
METHODOLOGY 2.
The research was gathered 
primarily through desk-based 
research. The secondary data on the 
subject was drawn from journals, 
newspapers, conference proceedings, 
government/corporate reports 
and Internet and was critically 
analyzed. According to Bryman 
[8], secondary analysis is analysis 
of data by researchers who will 
probably not have been involved in 
the collection of data and in addition, 
is concerned with analyzing already 
collected data within another study 
[9]. Secondary analysis allows for 
the examination of existing data, 
yet it can produce new and more 
detailed information, including the 
emergence of conclusions that differ 
from those in the original report 
[10]. The advantages of secondary 
analysis are that it provides high 
quality data [11] and, as a result of 
the quick and easy access to materials 
since documentary research is largely 
free of the restrictions and difﬁ  culties 
faced in primary data research, the 
researchers do not encounter rejection, 
non-response, bias, or any other 
respondent-based problems [12]. The
ﬁ  ndings and analysis are presented 
under the sub headings of: Kenya 
Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into 
Somalia and the International Law, 
Self-Defense in International Law,
The Consequences of KDF’s incursion
into Somalia, Kenya Defence Forces 
(KDF) Successful Capture of Kismayu 
is merely suspended hostilities with Al-
Shabaab, Reconstruction as a phase in 
war terminationand Escalated reprisal 
attacks against Kenya by Al-Shabaab 
since KDF’s incursion into Somalia.
3. KENYA DEFENCE 
FORCES’ (KDF) INCURSION 
INTO SOMALIA AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law holds that the 
use of force between states is illegal. 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits 
the “threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or politicalindependence of any State” [13]. 
The two exceptions to this general 
rule are the Security Council 
authorization for the use of force to 
keep peace as provided in Chapter 
VII of the Charter, and that done in 
self-defence. Article 51 of the United 
Nations (UN) Charter, that says 
“nothing shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and 
security.Measures taken by Members 
in exercise of this right of self defence 
shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council” [14].
There should be an armed attack 
prior to the preemptive strike for 
Article 51 to be applied. However, 
there is no unanimous interpretation 
of this provision. The advocates of 
preemption say there is no explicit 
mention of any prohibitions and the 
states have the right to act. Since 
there is no unanimous acceptance 
or rejection of whether an armed 
attack is a necessary pre-condition 
for preemption, it has generally been 
accepted that a preemptive strike can 
be launched irrespective of a prior 
armed attack [15].
3.1. Self-Defense 
in International Law
Article 51 is not the only 
authority that permits the use of 
force in self defense. Even though 
the issue of when an armed attack 
is justiﬁ   ed because of the right to 
self-defense is still under debate, 
the Security Council has clariﬁ  ed 
that “an attack must be underway or
must have already occurred in order
to trigger the right of unilateral self-
defense” unless an earlier response 
has already been approved by the 
Security Council. Therefore, no 
state can take it as its own right to 
attack another state on reasons that 
the latter is hypothetically planning 
or developing weapons for a likely 
campaign. The use of force should 
not involve “anything unreasonable
or excessive, since the act justiﬁ  ed
by the necessity of self-defence must
be limited by that necessity and kept
clearly within it” [16]. 
At the onset of the entry into 
Somalia, Kenya advanced the 
argument of the country’s right to 
self-defence as embodied in Article 
51 of the UN Charter, [17] which 
clearly recognizes the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-
defence in the wake of an armed 
attack against a member of the UN. 
The use of this particular article as 
the legal justiﬁ   cation for Kenya’s 
invasion raised a lot of questions 
regarding what constituted an 
armed attack against the state and 
whether such actions necessitated an 
incursion. Some argued that Kenya 
did not follow the right procedure 
required in pursuit of the right to 
self-defence as the country did not 
report its intended actions to the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) [18].
However, even after news of the 
invasion surfaced, the UNSC remained 
silent, despite the fact that it was not 
informed of Kenya’s intentions to 
intervene in Somalia. Utterances by 
the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon came nearly two months into 
the incursion; he commended Kenya 
on its role and efforts in stabilizing 
Somalia [19]. Many analysts have 
drawn comparisons between the incursion in Somalia and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq by the US [20].
Kenya’s incursion was launched 
“to protect its territorial integrity 
from foreign aggression” as 
explained by Saitoti, Kenya’s late 
minister for internal security a day 
before the launch of the incursion 
in mid October 2011[21]. This 
statement implied that the KDF 
would move in and advance as 
far into Somalia as possible in 
pursuit of Al-Shabaab terror 
group. The move marked Kenya’s 
largest military operation since its 
independence in 1963 [22].
4. THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF KDF’s INCURSION INTO 
SOMALIA
The incursion into Somalia has 
made Kenya more vulnerable on the 
domestic front as the country risked 
its national security as a result of 
the offensive in Somalia. By its 
incursion into Somalia, Kenya 
provided ample justiﬁ  cation for Al-
Shabaab to ﬁ  nally make good on its 
threats to attack Kenya. The terror 
group subsequently announced that 
it would carry out reprisal attacks 
against Kenya [23]. It was clear 
that the Al-Shabaab terror group 
is against Kenya intervention in 
Somalia. There have been escalated 
terror attacks in North Eastern, 
Coastal and Nairobi Counties since 
the beginning of the incursion, 
providing evidence that threats of 
Al-Shabaab counter attacks are real. 
By Al-Shabaab losing Kismayu 
to Kenya Defence Forces, reprisal 
attacks on Kenya are likely to 
become more pronounced [24].
4.1. Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)
and SNA’s Successful Capture of 
Kismayu is Merely Suspended 
Hostilities with Al-Shabaab
The Al-Shabaab terror group were 
uprooted from Kismayu by KDF 
and SNA forces. Military personnel 
possess a strong desire to ensure 
that assigned tasks are completed 
successfully and their conﬁ  dence in 
their own solutions makes it harder 
for them to accept a war ending short 
of victory. From a tradition of past 
conﬂ  icts, the notion of victory has 
widely pervaded into the military 
as the only form of ending a war 
with honour [25]. Nevertheless, Al-
Shabaab might only be retreating 
in order to regroup and re-emerge 
stronger in tactics similar to those of 
other radical groups like the Taliban 
in Afghanistan.
The capture of Kismayu by KDF 
and SNA has raised fundamental 
question, like: does Somalia’s young 
and newly-elected government have 
adequate means to govern Kismayu 
[26]. The question relating to the 
governance of Kismayu is one that 
needs to be addressed urgently so as   
to open the port for operation and the 
issue of the charcoal, estimated to 
cost billions, be sorted out. This the 
Somalia government should do in 
consultation with all stakeholders. 
4.2. Reconstruction 
as a phase in war termination
A key component of war 
termination is to determine how the 
liberated areas will hold free and fair 
elections and have democratically 
elected leaders to govern them. War 
will always come at a great cost. For 
Kenya the incursion into Somalia 
has been very expensive. Financial 
experts estimate the cost of the incursion at Ksh.210 million (US$2.8 
million) per month in personnel costs 
alone, this during a year when Kenya 
has recorded a Ksh.236 billion (US$3.1 
billion) total budget deﬁ  cit [27].
Kenya’s government has no ﬁ  nancial 
capability to do this in Somalia because 
the high cost of keeping troops in an 
open-ended war is one of the reasons 
behind Kenya’s decision to integrate 
into AMISOM [28]. It is estimated that 
the Kenya government is spending at 
least Sh200 million per month on the 
war, a staggering amount especially in 
a year of record Sh236 billion budget 
deﬁ  cit [29]. This inability to fund its 
own budget shows that it cannot fund 
the reconstruction in Somalia which 
is part of war termination [30].
The cost of supporting personnel, 
maintenance and procuring military 
equipment and hardware became 
too much for Kenya to bear alone. 
Therefore, the country turned to the 
international community, the UNSC, 
the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) and the AU 
to support its invasion of Somalia 
in the hope that this support would 
ease the ﬁ  nancial and legal burden 
of the invasion. The response was 
positive when, on 22 February 2012, 
the UNSC authorized an increase 
in the AMISOM force to 17,731 
troops. An increase in funding from 
US$300 million per annum to around 
US$500 million was also awarded 
[31].  However, the KDF allocation 
still accounted for the largest 
increase in the 2012/2013 Kenya 
budget at Ksh.70 billion [32]. This 
huge spending on the war continues 
to put pressure on the country’s 
budget as funds to the military are 
partly responsible for the diversion 
of spending from key sectors like 
agriculture, health environment and 
education.
5. ESCALATED REPRISAL 
ATTACKS AGAINST KENYA 
BY AL-SHABAAB SINCE KDF 
INCURSION INTO SOMALIA
The KDF incursion into Somalia 
has increased Kenya’s civilian 
casualties as reprisal attacks from 
Al-Shabaab [33]. In Kenya, grenade 
attacks did not only cost lives, they also 
fuelled feelings of resentment from 
locals who blamed the government 
for focusing more on the KDF 
invasion of Somalia while neglecting 
the internal security of the country. 
Seemingly, the KDF might have 
been successful in rallying up citizen 
opinion in support of the invasion 
during the early stages. However, if 
civilian casualties continue, the forces 
will receive more condemnation from 
citizens in Kenya.
The ﬁ   rst attack by Al-Shabaab 
was on a blue-collar bar known as 
Mwaura’s in downtown Mfangano 
Street in Nairobi on Monday, 24 
October 2011, at around 1:15am 
[34]. The hurled grenade left one 
person dead and wounded more than 
28 [35]. A second blast occurred 
later the same day, when a grenade 
was tossed out of a moving vehicle 
into the Machakos bus terminus 
where 59 men and ten women were 
subsequently hospitalized, of which 
two were in intensive care and ﬁ  ve 
people were conﬁ  rmed dead [36].
On November 5, 2011, a grenade 
attack at Garissa’s Pentecostal 
Church left two people dead and ﬁ  ve 
seriously injured while on November 
24, 2011 four people are killed by 
blasts in border towns. Three people were killed and scores wounded 
in twin grenade attacks in Garissa, 
one in Ngamia Road and the other 
at Chege’s Café. Militants blow 
up a Kenya military truck using an 
improvised bomb and open ﬁ  re on 
troops in Mandera. A soldier was 
killed and three others injured [37].
people injured while on December 
19, 2011 two people were injured 
after gunmen shot at them in Garissa 
Town and on December, 21, 2011 
police ofﬁ  cers escape unhurt after an 
explosion in Dadaab [39].
In January 1, 2012, four attackers 
in military uniform hurled a grenade 
at revelers celebrating the New Year at 
Locus night club in Garissa Town and 
indiscriminately sprayed bullets on 
hundreds ﬂ  eeing from the blast at the 
packed club, killing ﬁ  ve people and 
also killing an administration police 
ofﬁ   cer at Bula Sheikh residential 
area as they ﬂ  ed, while on January 
11, 2012 a bout 100 heavily-armed 
attackers bomb an administration 
police camp in Gerille Division, 
Wajir, killing seven people, including 
three administration police ofﬁ  cers. 
The attackers also stole a cache of 
assorted ﬁ  rearms, and abducted two 
government ofﬁ  cials [40].
In March 10, 2012 a series of 
explosions rocked Machakos bus 
station, Nairobi, killing six people 
and injuring 63 and in March 31, 2012 
a hand grenade and a home-made 
bomb were used in the simultaneous 
attacks at a prayer rally in Mtwapa 
and in a restaurant at Mombasa’s 
Tononoka area in which a man died 
and 33 other people were injured.
On 29 April 2012, an attack was 
reported at God’s House of Miracle 
Church at Ngara Estate in Nairobi [41]. 
One person died and 11 people 
were admitted at Kenyatta National 
Hospital [42]. In the month of May 
15, 2012 three grenades hurled at 
Bella Vista Club in Mombasa by 
unknown people killed a woman and 
injured ﬁ   ve other people [43]. An 
Administration police ofﬁ  cer  was 
killed and four others seriously injured 
Garissa is the most attacked town 
by Al-Shabaab sympathizers
The Al-Shabaab terror group is 
suspected of carrying out six attacks 
in Kenya in December 2011; some 
of the attacks resulted in injuries 
and casualties while some resulted 
in no injuries [38]. On December 
5, 2011 an administration police 
ofﬁ   cer was killed and three others 
critically injured in an explosion 
at IFO refugee camp in Garissa 
County. On December 11, 2011
two separate explosions caused 
by roadside improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) near the Somalia 
border left  an administration police 
ofﬁ  cer dead, and two regular police 
ofﬁ   cers injured in Mandera and 
nine Kenya Defence Forces soldiers 
wounded in Wajir when their truck 
ran over an explosive on the road. On 
December 12, 2011 an intelligence 
ofﬁ  cer and his driver were injured 
in an explosion in Wajir and on 
December 15, 2011 twin grenade 
attacks in Garissa, one at Florida 
Hotel and the other at a local prison 
ofﬁ  cers’ canteen at Bulaistin left two in Dagahaley, Lagdera Division, after 
the Land Cruiser they were travelling 
in was blown up by an explosive while 
on May 28, 2012 explosive blew off 
the roof of Assanand’s House on Moi 
Avenue, killing one person and injuring 
36 people.
On June 2, 2012 a man hurled a 
petrol bomb at the Nyerere Road Oil 
Libya petrol station in Kizingo. No 
one was injured while on June 24, 
2012 an explosion at Jericho Beer 
Garden in Mishomoroni, Mombasa 
left four people dead and 30 injured 
and ripped off the roof of a house 
next to the pub [44].
There were several terror attacks 
between the months of July and 
December. On 1 July at around 
10:15am, masked gunmen attacked 
two churches (the Central Catholic 
Cathedral and AIC churches) 
simultaneously in Garissa, located 
approximately 140 kilometers from 
the Somali border. The assailants killed 
seventeen people and left ﬁ  fty injured
[45]. The churches are 3 kilometers 
apartand the dead included two police 
ofﬁ  cers, four men, nine women and 
two children [46].
Four people were reported injured 
on 18 July when two hand grenades 
went off at a barbershop in Wajir. On 
July 21, 2012 police in Kitale arrested 
two terror suspects, Abraham Kemoi 
Setot and Caleb Anyela Onyango, 
who were on a mission to allegedly 
bomb the Umoja Catholic Church, 
a busy parish in the Eastlands area 
of Nairobi.  In addition, three police 
ofﬁ  cers were injured on 25 July when 
their patrol vehicle hit a landmine 
[47]. The police also arrested a man 
who was carrying two grenades at the 
Nakuru Agricultural Show shortly 
before President Mwai Kibaki arrived 
to deliver a speech [48].
On 3 August, one person was 
killed and six more were left injured 
at the Eastleigh neighborhood near 
the Kenya Airforce headquarters in 
Nairobi [49] and on 28 August, three 
Kenyan policeman were killed and 
over a dozen wounded in a grenade 
attack during riots in the port city of 
Mombasa over the killing of Islamist 
cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammed [50].
On 20 September, a 9 year old 
boy was killed when a grenade was 
hurled to Sunday school children at St 
Polycarp Anglican Church along Juja 
road in Nairobi [51]. On 21 September, 
four police ofﬁ  cers and three civilians 
were injured during a series of two 
explosions. The ﬁ  rst explosion targeted 
a GSU lorry and the secondary 
explosion went off when ofﬁ  cers 
rushed to the scene [52]. There were 
several attacks on administration 
police ofﬁ   cers in September. On 
30 September, two police ofﬁ  cers 
were shot dead from behind while 
patrolling along Ngamia road in 
Garissa [53].  Additionally, on 15 
September, two administration police 
ofﬁ  cers were injured in an explosion 
when their vehicle hit a landmine 
[54]. On 27 October, CID ofﬁ  cer 
Yussuf Yero was shot and killed in a 
Hagdera, Daadab mosque as he read 
the Koran [55].
On 1 November, a policeman 
was shot dead and another seriously 
injured by assailants in Garissa town. 
The ofﬁ   cers were on patrol when 
they were ambushed by four men, 
one of whom was a teenager [56].
On 4 November, a policeman was 
killed and 10 people were injured in a 
grenade attack on a church in Kenya 
[57]. On 18 November 10 people were 
killed and 25 seriously injured when an explosive went off on a mini-bus 
(matatu) in Eastleigh. The explosion is 
believed to be an improvised explosive 
device or bomb [58]. On 20 November, 
three Kenya Defence Forces soldiers 
were gunned down in Garissa as they 
changed their burst tyre.
An explosion went off on 5 
December in Eastleigh, Nairobi 
killing 1 person and wounding 6 
others [59]. The explosion that 
occurred during rush hour trafﬁ  c was 
caused by a roadside bomb [60]. On 7 
December 5 people were killed and 8 
others injured in an explosion near a 
mosque in Eastleigh area of Nairobi. 
The wounded included the former 
area Member of Parliament Abdi Yusuf 
Hassan [61]. A second attack was 
carried out at the same mosque on 16 
December, seriously injuring one person 
[62]. On 19 December, two people were 
injured after two blasts went off outside 
Al Amin mosque in Eastleigh area of 
Nairobi. The blasts took place during 
rush hour [63] and supected Al-shabab 
militants shot three people dead and 
injured one person on Kenyatta Street 
in Garissa on 20 December at 7pm. On 
27 December, at 11pm a police ofﬁ  cer 
was shot dead while his colleague 
escaped unharmed after being attacked 
by suspected Al-Shabaab terror group 
in Mandera town [64]. 
On 4 January, 2013 at 7pm two 
people were killed and seven wounded 
in a grenade attack at Dagahale area in 
Garissa. The grenade was hurled from 
a saloon car at a tent where people 
were chewing Khat [65]. A grenade 
was thrown into a police vehicle as 
it drove past a crowd along Ngamia 
road near the local District Ofﬁ  cer’s 
(DO) ofﬁ  ce on 7 January 2013. Four 
people including three police ofﬁ  cers 
were seriously wounded in a grenade 
attack on a police car in Garissa town 
[66]. On the evening of 9 January 
2013, two grenades were thrown into 
the World Food Programme (WFP) 
compound in Mandera Town. There 
were no injuries reported. The blast 
occurred as a group of worshipers 
were leaving a nearby mosque after 
their prayers [67].
A grenade was thrown into this passenger 
mini bus in Eastleigh area of Nairobi
Doctors attending to the injured
On 16 January 2013, suspected 
Al-Shabaab terror group shot dead 
5 people and injured 3 others at 
a restaurant in the eastern town 
of Garissa. Authorities said they 
believed the gunmen belonged to 
the Al-Shabaab group, because the 
victims included a senior prison 
warden, ﬁ  tting a pattern of attacks 
against security forces [68]. Two 
men believed to be suicide bombers 
of Somali origin died on the morning 
of 17 January 2013 after Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs) they had 
went off in Hagdera refugee camp in 
Dadaab [69].6. CONCLUSIONS
The incursion by Kenya Defence 
Forces (KDF) into Somalia and 
return of semblance of peace proved 
to be a daunting task, since other 
former initiatives by United Nations 
and United States of America with 
more resources and military might 
and experience had failed. A logical 
conclusion is that a military approach 
alone to counter a complex conﬂ  ict 
cannot work.
A more comprehensive and 
integrated approach involving 
political and social actors, relevant 
national stakeholders, as well as 
regional and international players is a 
better strategy to adopt. Kenya needs 
to understand that the elimination 
of Al-Shabaab from Somalia is not 
going to mean the end of the threat of 
terrorism within its own borders. The 
stability and development of Somalia 
will help create an environment where 
both Kenya and Somalia can co-exist 
peacefully as neighbors, resulting in 
more peaceful relations in the region
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
Demobilization and  A.
reintegration of Kenyan unemployed 
youths who had joined the terrorist group 
Al-Shabaab by providing amnesty, 
education, vocational opportunities and 
employment for former combatants 
may prevent them from rejoining Al-
Shabaab terrorist group.
Development of proactive  B.
policies to combat International 
terrorism. The government needs to 
reﬁ   ne current policies and explore 
alternative ways and means to 
combat International terrorism, 
especially given that al-Shabaab 
has resorted to launching counter-
attacks on Kenyan soil. Kenya 
cannot ignore the retaliatory terrorist
attacks that are now more prevalent 
within the country while ﬁ  ghting the 
enemy outside. It is prudent for the 
government to implement long-term 
measures to guard against threats to 
the country by enhancing the capacity 
of security personnel in strategic 
approaches to International terrorism 
at Kenya’s National Counter-Terrorism 
Centre which will provide enough 
pool of highly trained professionals 
in the area of counter-terrorism which 
will minimize the inﬁ  ltration by Al-
Shabaab and hence reduce collateral 
damage and deaths of Kenyans caused 
by Al-Shabaab terrorist.
A post Conﬂ  ict reconstruction  C.
plan- KDF having neutralized the 
threat of Al--Shabaab by the capture 
of Kismayu, the government of 
Kenya needs to partner with the 
Somali government to support the 
new administration by empowering 
the military and leaving them to take 
control of their country.
Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)  D.
combat success alone will not provide 
a sustainable peace. Recognize 
the importance of inclusivity in 
trying to achieve a stable Somalia. 
The conﬂ  ict in Somalia has socio-
political, economic and humanitarian 
dimensions to it that the Government 
of Kenya needs to recognize and 
take into consideration. Greater 
inclusion of the Somali government 
as well as regional and international 
stakeholders is important for efforts 
to stabilize Somalia.
Somali administration to  E.
take lead in decision-making-Since 
Somalia people have a young and 
fragile government, the government of Kenya should note that this new 
government needs to be consulted 
prior to any action being taken 
within its territory. It is imperative 
for Kenya to offer its support to the 
new government in dealing with Al-
Shabaab while Somalia is in the process 
of reconstructing its social fabric and 
physical infrastructure and resettling 
thousands of Somali refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons. 
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